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Abstract: Our target article, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience,” has
provoked a diverse range of commentaries. In this response we have collated what we
see as the major themes of the discussion. It is clear that we differ from some
commentators in our commitments to what subjective experience is and what the
midbrain is capable of. Here we clarify where we stand on those points and how our
view differs from some other influential perspectives. The commentaries have
highlighted the most lively areas of disagreement. We revisit here the debates
surrounding whether the cortex is essential for any form of consciousness in vertebrates,
how to interpret interventionist evidence, and whether any specific behavioural criteria
can be used to assess the occurrence of consciousness. We recognise that these debates
will not be resolved once and for all in this discussion, and we take this opportunity to
explore what new forms of experimental evidence might be needed to provide clarity.
We emphasise how functional neurobiological analyses in combination with careful
behavioural studies of a diverse range of animals will help progress our understanding of
how neural circuits can support different forms of behaviour. Ultimately this will help us
reach an understanding of how different conscious capacities could be supported by
neural systems, and which animals are capable of them.
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The first round of 19 commentaries on our target article (Klein & Barron, 2016a) cover
a wide range of issues and opinions. We will group our response into three categories:
commitments, conflicts and consequences.
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First, there are differing opinions on what is meant by subjective experience, what is
needed for it, and how it might be studied. Here we clarify what our commitments are,
and how we differ from some commentators. We then turn to clear points of conflict, of
which the most polarizing would be the roles of the cortex and subcortical structures in
conscious experience. In responding to these points of conflict, we focus on what sorts of
evidence might be needed to resolve them. Finally, some commentators have considered
some hypothetical consequences if our argument is in fact correct. We spell out what we
think the consequences might be, and offer some reactions to other arguments.
Commitments
Several commentators differ from us in their basic commitments. We do not know how
one might settle some of these disputes, but we think it is worth clarifying what we take
to be our basic commitments and why.
Subjective experience is the basal form of awareness. Our target article assumes that
subjective experience is the basal form of awareness. We think that this form of
subjective experience can and does occur without more complicated forms of selfreflection and self-experience. As Tye notes, this seems to be the right thing to say even
about human infants, so it's not a tremendous stretch. Furthermore, we are cautiously
committed to a claim that Rowlands attributes to us: we think there is some tight
connection between having subjective experience and having a first-person perspective
on the world. It is true that “phenomenal feel” is sometimes treated as an intrinsic
property that could attach to nearly anything, but we have in mind something like
Nagel's (1974) claim that "... fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if
and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism — something it is like for
the organism." Conversely, and for the same reason, we think that the particular features
of subjective experiences are specific to the organism that has those states, and so we
are wary of requiring substantial social organization as a necessary condition (unlike
van Hatteren).
Several commentators worry that the midbrain functions to which we appeal do not
seem like they are sufficient for subjective experience (Adamo; Allen-Hermanson;
Cruse & Schilling; Hill; Key, 2016b). Why couldn't bees be, in Allen-Hermanson's
(2008) nice turn of phrase, “natural zombies,” possessing function without awareness?
Here we think that conflicting intuitions stem from two distinct sources. The first is a
philosophical concern about the hard problem, and the apparent gap between the
functional and the phenomenological. We have little to add here beyond the fact that we
are, in Chalmers's (2003) taxonomy, committed Type-C materialists. We are
unimpressed by conceivability arguments. We think that scientific advances will show
where such arguments go wrong, as they have in other scientific domains.
The second source of conflict is, we suspect, an adherence to something like Lloyd
Morgan's (1894, 1903) Canon. Why posit consciousness when you can get by with mere
function? Surely, at least, the burden of proof lies, and lies heavily, on folks like us? This
sort of thing reaches its rhetorical high watermark in Brian Key's (2016a) jeremiad
elsewhere in this journal, where he analogizes those who posit fish pain to those who
believe in Russell's celestial teapot.
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Yet Morgan’s Canon has lately fallen on hard times (Andrews & Huss, 2014; Buckner,
2013; Fitzpatrick, 2008; Mikhalevich, 2015; Sober, 2015). One strand of this debate is
particularly relevant. Morgan (1903) famously suggested that:
“In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological
processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in
the scale of psychological evolution and development.” (p. 59)
Using Morgan's Canon thus not only presupposes a clear distinction between “high” and
“low,” but also that subjective experience falls on the “high” side of the line. We would
claim that subjective experience is evolutionarily old and phylogenetically widespread.
Hence appealing to Morgan's Canon simply begs the question.
Of course, lazy anthropomorphism is worth avoiding. The solution to that is evidence,
not a priori reflection on what capacities might be higher or lower. Indeed, we note that
Morgan updated his Canon between the 1894 and the 1903 editions to point out that
postulation of “higher” processes was perfectly acceptable so long as one had
"independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in the animal under
observation" (Morgan, 1903; Sober, 2015). We take ourselves to be providing precisely
that sort of independent evidence. More generally, evidence for animal consciousness
cannot be dismissed simply by claiming that consciousness is so advanced or complex or
mysterious that other explanations are to be preferred if available. One might equally
well run this as a modus tollens: if even insects have subjective experience, then
subjective experience was not as advanced or complex or mysterious as we once
thought.
Finally, and on a more conciliatory note, many commentators have pointed out the
wonderful diversity of other animals that may also be conscious. While we have focused
on insects, we are quite happy to see the present discussion extend to cephalopods
(Mather & Carere), decapods (Elwood), and cats (Shanahan).
The capacity of the midbrain. We begin with a few remarks on “capacity.” We claim
that structural features of the midbrain support the capacity to be conscious at all.
Attention to the content/capacity distinction also removes another potentially
misleading formulation. Several commentators took us to be saying that the
midbrain/diencephalon alone is sufficient for conscious experience (Adamo; AllenHermanson; Cruse & Schilling; Hill; Key, 2016b). This is a complex issue. Strictly
speaking, our claim is only about the capacity for subjective experience. Whether that
capacity is actualized in any particular case, and what the resulting contents of
subjective experience end up being, may depend on many different brain structures. The
important claim is that since there is no (fundamental) difference between humans and
insects in the type of functional processing that occurs, there cannot be any difference in
whether they have the capacity for subjective experience.
An important piece of our evidence for this claim is evidence about the effect of direct
interventions on the capacity for subjective experience in individual humans (Barron &
Klein, 2016; Merker, 2007, 2013). That is one reason we have focused on natural and
experimental interventions in humans. It is also why we have been impressed (as
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Merker, 2007, and Penfield & Rasmussen, 1959, were before us) with the relative
insensitivity of the capacity for subjective experience to cortical damage compared to
the profound effects of subcortical damage. One might take issue with our interpretation
of those results, of course. We consider those objections in the next section.
We do not claim that it is impossible for cortical damage to eliminate subjective
experience —just that insofar as it does, it does so because of its effects on subcortical
structures. While we do (cautiously) endorse Merker's (2007) claim that consciousness
in humans is possible without a cerebral cortex, this is not a necessary commitment. It
may be (as Mallat & Feinberg suggest) that in humans the neocortex has become
important secondarily for generating conscious contents, taking on functions ancestrally
supported subcortically, hence one cannot have completely contentless awareness
(Mallatt & Feinberg). Here there is much room for debate, as there is for debate over
which parts of the midbrain are most important.
We also make a specific set of claims about the functional processing of the midbrain
that make it the basis for the capacity for subjective experience. It is widely assumed,
including by many of our commentators (Chalmers, 1996; Edelman, Moyal, & Fekete;
Fekete & Edelman, 2011), that the proper way to describe the capacity for subjective
experience will be in functional or computational terms, rather than in basic neural or
molecular terms. Chief among these functional capacities is the ability to integrate
information about the sensory, homeostatic and motor processing of the organism into a
single unified model (Merker, 2007, 2013).
We do continue to insist, however, that whatever function is appealed to ought to be tied
relatively closely to specific biologically based problems and their solution in
evolutionary history. The fundamental features we have appealed to are ones that arise
when biological organisms begin moving around their environment under their own
control (Merker, 2005, 2007). We note that other authors who are in broad agreement
have emphasized a different set of functions: Eva Jablonska and colleagues emphasize
the role of unlimited associative learning (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2015). Morsella &
Walker's Passive Frame theory (Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger, & Gazzaley, 2015)
similarly focuses on action selection in the sense of constraining output to skeletal
muscle; with suitable adaptation this might be an interesting parallel. Similarly, although
we assumed that Global Workspace Theory would require unreasonably sophisticated
functioning, Shanahan's discussion suggests some interesting points of convergence.
We welcome these discussions, and do not take them to be conflicts per se but rather the
sort of conversation we hoped to open.
Conflicts
This set of commentaries has highlighted the most vigorous areas of disagreement
around our target article. Clearly we won't resolve disagreements once and for all here.
A better question might be: what new evidence would we need to resolve them?
Neuroanatomy: Are subcortical structures sufficient to support a capacity for
subjective experience, or is the cortex essential? This is perhaps the most critical
point of disagreement. We follow Merker (2005) in that we believe the processing
within the structures of the midbrain, basal ganglia and diencephalon are sufficient for
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the basic capacity of subjective experience, given our commitments above. Some
commentators broadly agree with us (Mallat & Feinberg; Merker). We particularly
acknowledge the contributions of Mallat & Feinberg who published in parallel to our
original paper an excellent book detailing a careful functional neuroanatomical and
phylogenetic analysis of the vertebrates (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016). They have
independently reached conclusions broadly similar to ours.
Others strongly disagree with us on this issue (Allen-Hermanson; Key, 2016b), and it
seems clear that the debate cannot be settled using just the evidence currently available
to us. What then would we need to give clarity? Here we agree with Key (2016b) that to
make progress we need far more detailed functional and computational analyses of the
brains of diverse animals. These data are coming, as connectomic initiatives and
computational modelling of neural systems advance. Our argument relies heavily on
functional analogies drawn across animal lineages. These analogies will be more
accurate once we have more information on the forms of computation that can be
supported by the brains of different animals. To understand the roles of the cortex and
subcortical structures, we need more of this kind of data from within the vertebrate
lineage as well as across other phyla.
(Key, 2016b) argues “that a phenomenally conscious nervous system must have
observer neural networks that are able to introspect and create meta-representations of
its sensory neural processing.” We are not so sure about this. An “observer neural
network” runs close to repackaging the philosophically difficult Cartesian theatre, or the
unhelpful concept of the “brain within the brain,” which we are not fond of. The concept
of “meta-representations” is also not a particularly clean one. If meta-representations
are simply higher order statistical summaries of sensory data, or recurrent neural
networks, then insects have these. Intrinsic neurons of the insect antennal and visual
lobes generate statistical summaries of sensory information to improve recognition and
classification of salient stimuli (Galizia, 2014; Horridge, 2005). Recurrent neural
networks and neuromodulatory elements feed back from integrative centers of the
insect brain to the sensory lobes to facilitate learning of likes and dislikes (“affect” in the
sense of Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016), and support the emotion-like behavioural changes
recently reported for honey bees (Perry, Baciadonna, & Chittka, 2016). We are not sure
that Key would consider these kinds of meta-representations as adding to the evidence
that the insect brain can support subjective experience, however. Even so, exploring the
relationships between meta-representations in nervous systems and subjective
experience will certainly help to bring clarity to this debate, and this is where the
perspective of computational modelling is especially needed.
The role of the vertebrate cortex — interpretation of interventionist evidence. Our
interpretation of anaesthesia and vegetative state studies is challenged by AllenHermanson, who notes that although we cite both Schiff (2010) and Långsjö et al.
(2012), these both make reference to a cortical contribution. Allen-Hermanson notes
that Långsjö et al. claim that "minimal cortical activity is necessary” for conscious
experience. It would have been worth quoting the relevant Långsjö et al. passage in full,
however:
“As shown in our results, only minimal cortical activity is necessary at this point.
Thus, emergence of a conscious state, the essential foundation of consciousness (Fig.
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1), precedes the full recovery of neocortical processing required for rich conscious
experiences.” (p. 4940)
One would have thought the qualifiers were rather important, and indeed a look at
Långsjö et al.’s (2012) Figure 1 confirms that there is very little activation at all outside
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The ACC is also the only cortical area cited by Schiff
(2010), and then only because "it receives strong inputs for the anterior intralaminar
nuclei" and "very diffuse regulatory input across large territories of the rostral striatum"
— in short, because of its causal relationship to midbrain structures. Unilateral lesions
to ACC aren't traditionally associated with loss of consciousness but with disorders of
affective regulation (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). Bilateral lesions can produce akinetic
mutism, but there is substantial evidence that akinetic mute patients are still conscious
(Klein, Forthcoming).
Several commentators (Allen-Hermanson; Paul & Mendl) mentioned blindsight as a
possible counterexample. Here we think there is some confusion about our position. We
have consistently emphasized that the cortex has an important role in shaping the
contents of human experience. It is no surprise that damage to visual cortex removes
whole categories of visual experience. The interpretation of blindsight cases is
complicated by ongoing debates over whether there is a real distinction between Type 1
and Type 2 blindsight (Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, Bergholt, & Cleeremans, 2008;
Overgaard & Mogensen, 2015). As McPherson (2015) notes, it is also unclear what
would count as distinctively visual phenomenology: if motion and form (for example)
can be perceived in the absence of color and edge perception, then Type 2 blindsight
might be more interpretable. We remain neutral about whether, in humans, subcortical
structures alone are sufficient for any particular visual experience (rather than the
capacity to have visual experience at all).
Finally, we note again that the question of how to interpret the evidence from cortical
lesion studies (Allen-Hermanson) is separate from whether animals lacking a cortex
might be capable of subjective experience. An animal with a cortical lesion or
intervention is not the same as an animal that never had a cortex. We highlight Mallat &
Feinberg's intriguing hypothesis that the cortex might look special in higher mammals
because, once it evolved, key functions supporting consciousness became far more
dependent upon the cortex than on subcortical structures. This is worth exploring;
functional analyses of the brains of a good phylogenetic spread of vertebrates would be a
way forward.
Behaviour: Are there key behavioural criteria for subjective experience? There is
clearly a lot of disagreement over what behavioural capacities, if any, demonstrate
subjective experience. Van Hatteren argues that dynamic social bonding is needed
because it requires animals to engage in communication that involves transforming their
state of agency and goals into communicative signals. Van Hateren proposes this
transformation must be so complex it must presuppose subjective experience. We agree
that complex communication of one's state of self could be indicative of forms of
consciousness. There are good reasons humans care a lot about other humans'
declarative reports of their sense and state of self. But as we have emphasized, we do not
feel this sort of behavioural evidence is necessary for the existence of subjective
experience.
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Tye proposes that evidence of meta-cognition would show an animal is conscious of the
things it is meta-cognizing about, but he also imagines that an animal could be capable of
basic subjective awareness without being able to demonstrate meta-cognitive abilities.
We are cautious about meta-cognition as evidence for any particular level of
consciousness. We have been able to show that honey bees’ behaviour in a choice task is
influenced by their internal state of uncertainty about the correct choice (Perry &
Barron, 2013). Bees were trained in a visual discrimination task in which they received
reward for a correct choice, quinine for an incorrect choice, or could simply exit the trial
(opt-out). Opting out improved bees’ performance overall – especially when the
discrimination task was difficult (Perry & Barron, 2013). This is interpreted as indicating
that use of the opt-out was biased toward trials they were most likely to fail at. In
vertebrate studies this has been interpreted as behavioural evidence of animals
adjusting their choice behaviour according to their certainty of success (Crystal & Foote,
2009; Smith, Beran, Couchman, Coutinho, & Boomer, 2009); this meets some operational
definitions of metacognitive behaviour (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Nelson, 1996).
However, this kind of response could be achieved without a bee’s having a neural
representation of its state of uncertainty. This kind of behavioural response could occur
if opting out is a default response when the two choices cannot be effectively
distinguished and are equally attractive (Perry & Barron, 2013).
We don’t think any behavioural criteria on their own will ever differentiate animals that
have subjective experience from those that don’t. What are needed are careful
behavioural analyses of what animals can do in combination with neurobiological
analyses of how they do it. Neurobiological analyses of the scope and mechanisms of the
animal brain’s capacity to represent, unify, weight, value and select sensory information
will allow us to make evidence-based statements about the capacity of the animal mind.
Progress is already being made here. We particularly highlight the work of van
Swinderen’s lab (Paulk et al., 2014; van Swinderen, 2005; van Swinderen & Greenspan,
2003) exploring the neurobiological mechanisms of selective attention in insects.
Consequences
Do insects feel pain? Several commentators focused on the question of whether insects
feel pain (Elwood; Paul & Mendl). Though pain was not part of our original argument,
we do want to clarify where we stand.
The term “pain” is multiply ambiguous (Hare, 1964). In the most basic sense (what we
sometimes refer to as “physical pain”), it is a sensation associated with protection of
bodily integrity in the face of injury. It is thus one of many sensations associated with
behaviourally mediated homeostasis (Klein, 2015), along with sensations like hunger,
thirst, dyspnea, core warmth and coldness, the felt need to urinate and defecate, the
hunger for specific nutrients (like sodium) and so on (Craig, 2002; Denton, 2006; Klein,
2015). All of these sensations are basic to survival, and it should not surprise us if they
turn out to be widespread.
We think it is obvious that insects feel pain in this sense. Indeed, we are a bit mystified at
the vehemence with which it is denied here and elsewhere given the link between pain
and other homeostatic sensations. One might deny that fish are conscious at all — but
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surely if they are conscious, there is no serious debate about whether they get hungry.
We suggest that a similar response is appropriate for pain. Adamo wonders what a
robot might gain from feeling pain. Yet there is a perfectly straightforward story about
why pain (as opposed to mere withdrawal reflexes) is adaptive. As Elwood notes for
decapods, “Finely tuned decisions that weigh and trade off different motivations can be
observed in decapods in response to noxious stimuli.” In general, homeostatic demands
are one part of the Merker (2007) triangle, broadly relevant to all actions.
Ethical consequences. Several commentators noted that our position might have
profound ethical implications (Fischer; Lamey). As Fischer notes, sentience is often the
criterion that separates things which don't deserve moral consideration from the things
which might. Yet if insects do deserve serious moral consideration, we're in a bit of a
bind. We kill unimaginable numbers of insects in the course of modern life, mostly
without even trying. While our work was not motivated by ethical considerations, we
are willing to follow the consequences where they lead.
The common and sensible position seems to be that if insects are conscious, then they
have moral standing — in Fischer's terms, we have obligations to insects, not merely
regarding insects — but that how much we owe to insects depends on what they are
conscious of. This may seem like a trivial point, but it is worth emphasizing. If insects
feel pain, that probably gives us more reason to care about their interests than if they
just feel slightly sleepy all the time. Similarly, if there is a difference between feeling pain
and suffering, then organisms that feel both arguably deserve more concern.
Clarifying what different organisms feel might then result in a gradated scale of moral
duty, with insects somewhere near the bottom. Fischer suggests that the distinction
between basic and sophisticated interests might provide a means for ranking. Lamey
recommends traditional criteria such as psychological unity or the ability to suffer. It is
also possible (though neither author emphasizes the distinction) that these criteria
could be used in different ways. Insect and human standing might be comparable, in the
sense that we could ask how many fleas could be killed to make a dog's life better
(Lamey). Or, we might simply think that insects belong to a lower and incommensurate
“tier” of moral interest, so that we should always prefer them to plants and prefer
mammals to them (whatever the numbers on each side).
We are not ethicists; we leave these debates to those better suited. The important thing
to emphasize is that ethical standing, on any of these accounts, depends on the contents
of subjective experience. The scientific work of sorting out those contents thus remains
paramount. That said, we think one point in particular is worth emphasizing. Most
discussions have focused on what we might owe to individual invertebrates. This is a
natural extension of human ethics, but perhaps misleading. Sentience aside, many of our
moral concerns are shaped by the fact that we live long lives, and that we put relatively
large amounts of resources into our children and others around us, expecting them to
also live long lives. None of this translates well to invertebrates. Instead, we might think
of invertebrates as something we owe duties to in aggregate. (Note that this should be
distinguished sharply from a view that says that insect collectives like hives have moral
standing as individuals, a position we find implausible.) That is, we may have a duty to
honey bees to make sure that they don't go extinct from our pesticide usage, even if it is
hard to drum up much sympathy for any particular bee.
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Evolution — why did subjective experience evolve, and how often? If it is possible
to determine which animals have subjective experience and which do not, then we will
be positioned to subject the trait to a phylogenetic analysis. This will show how often
subjective experience has evolved, and whether (and if so how often) it has been lost.
From this we will be able to infer the evolutionary circumstances that promote the
evolution of subjective experience. Søvik & Perry present a first shot at a synthesis.
We have argued above that assessing whether a species has subjective experience
demands integrated behavioural, functional neurobiological and neurocomputational
analyses. To draw sound phylogenetic conclusions, we will need data from a broad range
of species across clades as well as sufficiently deep sampling within clades to capture
diversity. Where should we start? We agree with Elwood that the crustaceans (as a
sister group to insects) would be a very informative group for testing and extending our
hypotheses about subjective experience in arthropods. Mollusca deserve special
mention. The cognitive capacities of cephalopods are much vaunted (Mather & Carere).
But the cephalopods also sit within perhaps the most interesting comparative group.
Within the extant representatives of Mollusca there is more variation in nervous system
organisation, body plan and life history strategy than any other phylum. This would be
an excellent group with which to elaborate a detailed comparative analysis of subjective
experience.
Conclusion
While the extent to which non-human animals are conscious is hardly a new debate, we
are probably the first to propose a neurobiological argument for why insects might have
the capacity for a basic form of consciousness. That proposition, and these responses to
it, demonstrate the rapid evolution of current thinking both about what is needed to
support a capacity for consciousness and about what the insect brain is capable of.
As an indicator of how much things have changed: in 1984 Eisemann et al. characterised
insect behaviour in the following way:
"By contrast, most insect behavior patterns are to a large extent pre-programmed
leaving much less scope for individual learning of appropriate behavior from
noxious and 'pleasant' stimuli, although there is a capacity for learning (including
avoidance) in both intact and decapitated insects and in isolated ganglia." (p. 165)
That view now seems very outdated. In our papers this year we have presented a model
of the kinds of integrated processing we believe the insect brain is capable of, and an
argument why we believe this processing is sufficient to support subjective experience
(Barron & Klein, 2016; Klein & Barron, 2016a). We argue that both of these aspects of
the thesis should be testable and refutable. Certainly functional neurobiological analyses
of the insect brain are progressing at an enormous speed thanks to advances in
connectomics (Chiang et al., 2011), neurogenetic technologies (Seelig & Jayaraman,
2015) and methods of neural modeling, among other things. Our expectation is that as
we learn more about how neural circuits do things and support different forms of
behaviour, we will be better placed to describe what kinds of neural systems will be
needed to support different forms of consciousness. We have previously proposed that
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Chalmers’s “hard problem" of consciousness is hard “not because it has no answer, but
because we do not yet know what a satisfying answer could look like” (Klein & Barron,
2016b). We argue that functional analyses of diverse animal brains can help us frame an
answer to the hard problem of consciousness.
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